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Abstract
The continuous-time version of Kyle’s (1985) model of asset pric-
ing with asymmetric information is studied, and generalized in various
directions, i.e., by allowing time-varying noise trading, and by allow-
ing the orders of the noise traders to be correlated with the insider’s
signal. From rather simple assumptions we are able to derive the opti-
mal trade for an insider; the trading intensity satisfies a deterministic
integral equation, given perfect inside information.
We use a new technique called forward integration in order to find
the optimal trading strategy. This is an extension of the stochastic
integral which takes account of the informational asymmetry inherent
in this problem. The market makers’ price response is found by the
use of filtering theory. The novelty is our approach, which could be
extended in scope.
KEYWORDS: Insider trading, asymmetric information, equilib-
rium, strategic trade, filtering theory, forward integration
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1 Introduction
We take as our starting point the seminal paper of Kyle (1985), where a
model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is presented. Traders
submit order quantities to risk-neutral market makers, who set prices com-
petitively by taking the opposite position to clear the market. Excluding
the market makers, the model has two kinds of traders: a single risk neutral
informed trader and noise traders. The informed trader rationally antici-
pates the effects of his orders on the price, i.e., he acts non-competitively or
strategically. In the presence of noise traders it is impossible for the mar-
ket makers to exactly invert the price and infer the informed trader’s signal.
Thus markets are semi-strong, but not strong form efficient.
In this model the insider makes positive profits in equilibrium by ex-
ploiting his monopoly power optimally in a dynamic context. Noise trading
provides camouflage which conceals his trading from market makers. An im-
portant issue is to demonstrate that this is possible in equilibrium without
destabilizing prices.
Kyle’s approach is to first study a one-period auction, then extend the
analysis to a model in with auctions take place sequentially, and finally let-
ting the time between the auctions go to zero, in which case a limiting model
of continuous trading is obtained. Back (1992) formalize and extend the
continuous-time version of the Kyle model, by i.a., the use of dynamic pro-
gramming.
There is a rich literature on the one period model, as well as on discrete
insider trading, e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988), and others, all adding insights to this class of problems. Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) present a different approach, containing similar results
to Kyle. Before Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) there is also
a huge literature on insider trading in which the insider acts competitively,
e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
The purpose of this article is to study the continuous-time model directly,
not as a limiting model of a sequence of auctions, and use certain aspects
of the modern methodological machinery in continuous-time modeling to
resolve the problem of the informed trader, in a more general setting with
time-varying noise trading, where the orders of the noise traders are also
allowed to depend upon the insider’s private information. Furthermore, we
do not assume that the final price pT equals the insiders signal v˜, but show
that this is a consequence of our other model assumptions. The wealth of the
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insider can be represented as a stochastic integral of his orders with respect
to the changes in the market price. This integral is not of a standard form,
since the insider’s order is not in the information set generated by the prices.
This is precisely where a key part of the problem lies; the insider has more
information then reflected in the market prices.
There is, however, an extension of the stochastic integral, called the for-
ward integral, in which the usual information constraint of this type of analy-
sis need not be satisfied. This is exactly what we need in the present context
of asymmetric information.
The prices set by the market makers are in the form of a conditional
expectation, which calls for the use of filtering theory. Combining these two
methodologies, we are able to solve the insider’s problem in a direct way,
leading to a deterministic integral equation for the insider’s trading intensity
β(t) at time t, given his information set with perfect forward information.
We solve the integral equation for the trading intensity β(t) by by trans-
forming this equation to a non-linear, separable differential equation, which
calls for a simple solution. This we compare to the solution of Kyle (1985)
(and also Back (1992)). In the special case of time homogeneous noise trad-
ing, we recover the Kyle-solution. For time-varying noise trading we get the
result that the market depth is still a constant, and the expected (ex ante)
profits of the insider depends on the average volatility process.
2 The Model
At date T there is to be a public release of information that will perfectly
reveal the value of an asset; cf. fair value accounting. Trading in this asset
and a risk-free asset with interest rate zero is assumed to occur continuously
during the interval [0, T ]. The information to be revealed at time T is rep-
resented as a signal v˜, a random variable which we interpret as the price
at which the asset will trade after the release of information. This informa-
tion is already possessed by a single insider at time zero. The unconditional
distribution of v˜ is assumed to be normal with parameters µv˜ and σv˜.
In addition to the insider, there are liquidity traders who have random,
price-inelastic demands, and risk neutral market makers. All orders are mar-
ket orders and the net order flow is observed by all market makers. We denote
by zt the cumulative orders of liquidity traders through time t. The process
z is assumed to be a Brownian motion with mean zero and variance rate σ2t ,
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i.e., dzt = σtdBt, where σt > 0 is a deterministic continuously differentiable
function on [0, T ], for a standard Brownian motion B defined on a probabil-
ity space (Ω, P ). Note that we do not assume that v˜ is independent of Bs;
s ≤ T . This makes it necessary to use anticipative stochastic calculus. We
use forward integrals to model this situation. See (2.5) below and Appendix
1. We let xt be the cumulative orders of the informed trader, and define
(2.1) yt = xt + zt for all t ∈ [0, T ]
as the total orders accumulated by time t.
Market makers only observe the process y, so they cannot distinguish
between informed and uninformed trades. Let Fyt = σ(ys; s ≤ t) be the
information filtration of this process. Since the market makers are assumed
to be perfectly competitive and risk neutral, they will set the price pt at time
t as follows
(2.2) pt = E(v˜|Fyt ),
which we will call a rational pricing rule. We assume that the insider’s
portfolio is of the form
(2.3) dxt = (v˜ − pt)βtdt, x0 = 0,
where β ≥ 0 is some deterministic function, both assumptions consistent
with Kyle (1985).1 The function βt is the trading intensity on the information
advantage (v − pt) of the insider.
Denote the insider’s wealth by w and the investment in the risk-free asset
by b. The budget constraint of the insider can best be understood by con-
sidering a discrete time model. At time t the agent submits a market order
xt−xt−1 and the price changes from pt−1 to pt. The order is executed at price
pt, in other words, xt is submitted before pt is set by the market makers. The
investment in the risk-free asset changes by bt − bt−1 = −pt(xt − xt−1), i.e.,
buying stocks leads to reduced cash with exactly the same amount. Thus,
the associated change in wealth is (which was pointed out by Back (1992))
(2.4) bt − bt−1 + xtpt − xt−1pt−1 = xt−1(pt − pt−1).
1The finite variation property of x is assumed by Kyle (1985), and an equilibrium where
this is the case is found by Back (1992).
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In other words, the usual accounting identity for the wealth dynamics is of the
same type as in the standard price-taking model, except for one important
difference; while, in the rational expectations model, the number of stocks in
the risky asset at time t is depending only on the information available at this
time, so that both the processes x and p are adapted processes with respect
to the same filtration, here the order x depends on information available only
at time T for the market makers (and the noise traders). As a consequence
writing the dynamic equation for the insider’ wealth as follows
wt = w0 +
∫ t
0
xsdps
is not well defined as a stochastic integral in the traditional interpretation,
since pt is Fyt -adapted, and xt is not.
Let us define the information filtration of the informed trader as Gt =
Fyt ∨ σ(v˜). Thus the informed trader knows v˜ at time zero and observes yt
at each time t. Obviously the filtration Gt ⊃ Fyt and this extension is not
of a trivial, or technical type, but a significant one. For example, there is
information in Gt for any t ∈ [0, T ) that will only be revealed to the market
makers at the future time T . The key point here is that from (2.3) the order
xt depends on v˜ which is not in Fyt . Since the insider knows the realization
of v˜ at time 0, he has long-lived forward-looking information. When z is
not assumed to be independent of v˜, the extension of the ordinary stochastic
integral to a semimartingale setting is not justified any longer.2
In the stochastic integral representing the budget constraints xt is Gt-
measurable, and pt is Ft-measurable which is the violation of the standard,
important requirement of any stochastic integral in the traditional interpre-
tation.
There is, however, a stochastic integration theory based on the so-called
forward integral, which turns out to be useful under the informational asym-
metry that we have. It is a natural extension of the usual stochastic integral,
with the informational constraints that we require of the dynamic wealth
equation based on the above budget constraints. It is denoted by
(2.5) wt = w0 +
∫ t
0
xsd
−ps,
2It does not help here to extend to a stochastic integral of a predictable process with
respect to a semimartingale, as in Back (1992). In his case this procedure was valid, since
z was explicitly assumed independent of v˜.
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where d−ps stands for forward integration. From its very definition, which is
given by a limit (in probability) of the usual partial sums of the type appear-
ing in (2.4), it follows that it will have the correct financial interpretation,
given that the concept is meaningful. It turns out that it is, and naturally
the forward integral will not possess many of the standard properties of the
stochastic integral, but there is a version of Itoˆ’s formula that still is valid,
and which we need in the following (see Appendix I for a definition, Itoˆ’s
formula, and references).
We can now formulate the problem: The insider wants to solve, for each
time point t
(2.6) max
x
E(wT |Gt)
subject to the price p satisfying the rational pricing rule (2.2), the insider’s
strategy x satisfying (2.3), and the dynamic forward stochastic differential
equation (2.5) holding for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Usually the assumption is made that pT = v˜ a.s., but as we will show
below, this is a consequence of our other model assumptions. This result
seems natural, ensuring that all information available has been incorporated
in the price at the time T of the public release of the information.
Since there is a tacit understanding that the price process p is continuous
in this model, this result also means that the insider must trade continuously
throughout the time interval [0, T ], and we can expect that the trading in-
tensity β must be large as t approaches T in order for this condition to be
satisfied. 3
An equilibrium is a pair (p, x) such that p satisfies (2.2), given x, and
x is an optimal trading strategy solving (2.6), given p. We now have the
following result:
Theorem 2.1. Given the linear trading strategy (2.3), the optimal trading
intensity β(t) is given by
(2.7) βt =
(∫ T
0
σ2sds
S0
) 1
2 σ2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
3If the price pt 6= v˜ for some t < T , and the agent did not trade in [t, T ), there would
have to be a jump in the price at time T , which the results of our model rule out. This
would not be rational for the insider to do, as he would miss some profit opportunities by
not trading.
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The corresponding price pt set by the market makers is
(2.8) pt = E(v˜) +
∫ t
0
λsdys,
where y˜t defined by dy˜t =
1
σt
dyt is a Brownian motion with respect to the
market makers’ information, and the price sensitivity λt is given by
(2.9) λt ≡ λ = S
1
2
0( ∫ T
0
σ2sds
) 1
2
; a constant over time.
At the terminal time T the price pT corresponding to the optimal insider
insider tensity β satisfies
(2.10) pT = v˜ a.s.
Remark 2.2 To summarize, our paper differes from the papers of Kyle
(1985) and Back (1992) both with respect to basic assumptions and method:
(i) We do not assume that v˜ is independent of {z(s); 0 ≤ s ≤ T}. Because
of this, the integral in (2.5) may not exist as a semimartingale inte-
gral. Therefore we have to deal with anticipative stochastic calculus,
by means of the forward integral.
(ii) We do not assume that the volatility σ(t) of the noise traders is con-
stant. Nevertheless we prove that the price sensitivity λt is constant
also in our case, if the optimal strategy is applied.
(iii) We do not assume a priori that
pT = v˜ a.s.
But this is proved to be the case if the optimal strategy is used.
We remark that if we had made this assumption a priori, then our proof
could have been simplified as follows: The last term in (4.14) would
have been 0. Hence (see (4.16)) we would have S
(β)
t,T = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]
and Problem 1 would automatically reduce to Problem 2.
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(iv) We do not assume a priori that the strategy xt is incospicuous, i.e. that
1
σt
dyt =
1
σt
xtdt+ dzt
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own filtration. However, this
is proved to hold if xt is chosen optimally.
(v) We do not assume a priori that there exists a function H such that
pt = H(t, yt).
But this is proved to be the case if the insider acts optimally.
(vi) Finally, since we are not assuming a Markovian setup we cannot use
dynamic programming (the HJB equation) to find the optimal strategy,
but we use forward integrals and a perturbation argument instead.
Remark 2.3 It is interesting to note that also in our general setting the to-
tal order process yt becomes a Brownian bridge if the optimal insider strategy
is used. To see this we proceed as follows:
By (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) we have
dyt = (v˜ − pt)βtdt+ σtdBt
= (v˜ − E[v˜]− λyt)βtdt+ σtdBt
=
[(∫ T
0
σ2udu
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜])− yt
] σ2t dt∫ T
t
σ2udu
+ σtdBt .(2.11)
Thus yt is the bridge of the process zt =
∫ t
0
σsdBs, conditioned to arrive at
the terminal value
yT =
(∫ T
0
σ2udu
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜])
at time t = T .
In particular, if σt = σ is constant we get
(2.12) dyt =
[
σ
( T
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜])− yt
] dt
T − t + σ dBt,
and hence 1
σ
dyt is the classical Brownian bridge, conditioned to arrive at( T
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜])
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at time t = T .
In Section 4 we present a proof of Theorem 2.1. First we discuss the
properties of the solution.
3 Properties of the equilibrium.
The generalization relative to Kyle (1985) included in Theorem 2.1 allows for
a time varying volatility parameter in the order process of the noise traders.
One would, perhaps, expect that as a consequence the market liquidity func-
tion λt would depend on time, suggested by the expression (4.39) in the next
section. The result of Theorem 2.1 is that it does not. The intuition for this
can be explained as follows:
The trading intensity βt will typically increase as t approaches T , since
the insider becomes increasingly desperate to utilize his residual information
advantage. In particular, from expression (2.7) in Theorem 2.1 we see that
βt/σ
2
t increases as t increases. It follows from the proof in the next section,
equations (4.38) and (4.39), that the price sensitivity λt can be written
λt =
βtSt
σ2t
.
Here
St := E[(v˜ − pt)2] and S0 = E[(v˜ − E[v˜])2].
Furthermore St can be shown to have the form
St =
S0
1 + S0
∫ t
0
β˜2sds
; t ∈ [0, T ],
(see equation (4.7)) where
β˜t =
βt
σt
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The quantity
∫ t
0
β˜2sds measures the the ”amount” of insider trading to liq-
uidity trading by time t. As this quantity increases over time, the amount of
private information St remaining at time t is seen, from the above expression,
to decrease, where St is the (mean square) distance between v˜ and pt. The
function λt is seen to depend on two effects:
9
(i) The quantity βt/σ
2
t increases over time, which tends to increase λt as time
t increases.
(ii) The quantity St decreases over time, suggesting that the insider’s infor-
mation advantage is deteriorating, which tends to decrease λt as t increases.
In equilibrium (i) is offset by (ii) and λt = λ is constant over time.
Notice that the important quantities are βt/σ
2
t and βt/σt = β˜t in the above
arguments. The mere fact that the amount of insider trading represented by∫ t
0
β2sds is large, is no guarantee that the market price pt is close to the
fundamental value v˜, i.e., that St is small. It could be that the amount
of noise trading
∫ t
0
σsds is also large, in which case the insider could hide
his trade, and less information about the true value would be revealed to
the market makers. Similarly, we do not know that βt is monotonically
increasing over time, only that βt/σ
2
t is. Notice that the equilibrium value
of the price sensitivity λ can be interpreted as the square root of a ratio,
where the numerator is the amount of private information, ex ante, and the
denominator is the amount of liquidity trading.
From the expressions in Theorem 2.1 we notice that
βt =
1
λ
σ2t∫ T
t
σ2sds
so βt is inversley related to λ for each t. Since the quantity 1/λ measures the
market depth, the insider will naturally trade more intensely, ceteris paribus,
when this quantity is large.
From the general discussion in Kyle (1985) it is indicated that if the slope
of the residual supply curve λt ever decreases (i.e., if the market depth ever
increases), then unbounded profits can be generated. This is inconsistent
with an equilibrium, so λt must be monotonically non-decreasing in any
equilibrium. It is argued that this follows since in continuous time, the
informed trader can act as a perfectly discriminating monopsonist, moving
up or down the residual supply curve (i.e., the market is infinitely tight).
Hence, he could exploit predictable shifts in the supply curve. From the
analysis of Back (1992) it is known that, more generally, this slope must be
a martingale given the market makers’ information. Our result that λt is
indeed a constant is, accordingly, consistent with the literature.
One would, perhaps, expect that the insider, since he can be assumed to
know the function σt, may use it to further conceal his trade in that he will
use a high βt at a time when σt is large. This impression is confirmed by
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investigating the optimal trading intensity β appearing in expression (2.7) of
Theorem 2.1.
However, when σt is low the insider must apply a correspondingly lower
trading intensity, and it turns out that the expected (ex ante) profits average
out. This can be demonstrated as follows: Consider the expected wealth of
the insider
E[wT ] = w0 + S0
∫ T
0
βtdt
1 + S0
∫ t
0
β˜2sds
,
an expression which follows from the results of the next section. Here
the last term is the expected (ex ante) profits, which can be shown to be√
S0
∫ T
0
σ2t dt.
4 Thus, trading at a time-varying volatility σt corresponds ex-
actly, when it comes to expected profits, to trading at a constant volatility
σ determined by σ2 = 1
T
∫ T
0
σ2t dt, the right comparison in this regard.
When the amount of liquidity trading
∫ t
0
σ2sds is large, we noticed above
that λ is small, in which case the insider’s profit is large. However, a small
value of λ is, in isolation, no guarantee for a large ex ante profit of the insider,
since a large value of S0 also makes the profit of the insider large, and λ large
as well.
This points in one possible direction for extending the present model.
Suppose that the private information is connected to quaterly accounting
data for the firm, so T stands for one quarter, and let us extend the model
beyond T to 2T , 3T, · · · , etc. Let us, as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988),
imagine two types of liquidity traders, discretionary and non-discretionary.
Just after each disclosure period of length T , the level of private information
relative to the uninformed is at its minimum. It seems reasonable, from the
above formula for the ex ante profits of the insider, that the discretionary
traders, acting strategically to time their trades, should concentrate their
trade to these times in order to loose less to the insider. That this kind
behavior is optimal is expected from the conclusions of Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988), who noticed that λ is a constant is not in accordance with empirical
findings; the bid ask spread 2λ is varying over time.
We also have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose σt = σ > 0 is a constant. Then the optimal trading
4In the case when σt = σ is a constant, we get that the expected profits equal σ
√
S0T ,
consistent with Kyle (1985).
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intensity for the insider is
(3.1) βt =
σ
√
T√
S0(T − t)
; 0 ≤ t < T.
The corresponding price pt set by the market makers is given by
(3.2) dpt = λtdyt,
where
(3.3) λt ≡ λ =
√
S0
σ
1√
T
; a constant for all t ∈ [0, T ).
This result follows from Theorem 2.1 by setting σs ≡ σ in (4.42). The
results of Corollary 1 are in agreement with Kyle (1985) and Back (1992)
(when we set T = 1).
Recently, a paper of related interest by Eide (2007) came to our knowl-
edge. Her work, which was done independently of ours, differs from ours in
several ways: She focuses on the situation when the price process v˜t of the
stock is assumed to have a specific dynamics (an Itoˆ diffusion and a mar-
tingale with respect to an independent Brownian motion), and its current
value v˜t (not v˜T ) is known to the insider at time t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. She
avoids the use of forward integrals by assuming a priori that the processes
are semimartingales with respect to the relevant filtrations. Like Back she
then assumes that the market makers set the price equal to pt = H(t, yt) for
some function H and that H(t, yt) = E(v˜T |Fyt ). These assumptions put the
problem of finding a corresponding equilibrium into a Markovian context,
which allows her to solve the problem by using dynamic programming. In
conclusion, her a priori assumptions are stronger than ours, but they enable
her to solve other problems than we do. In particular, the final stock value
v˜ = v˜T need not be normally distributed in her case.
We now present the proof of Theorem 2.1. It can be noted to be rather
different from the corresponding development in Kyle (1985).
4 The solution of the problem
From the requirement that the market makers are able to calculate the correct
conditional expectation of v˜ at all times, we are led to consider filtering
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theory, which involves the following system of equations:
(4.1) dv˜t = 0, v˜0 = v˜, (system equation)
and
(4.2) dyˆt = v˜βtdt+ dzt, (observation equation).
Let F yˆt = σ(yˆs; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of the process yˆ. The
innovation process y is defined by
(4.3) dyt = (v˜ − E(v˜|F yˆt )βtdt+ dzt
Let Fyt = σ(ys; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of the process y. Then
we have:
Lemma 1. Fyt = F yˆt ; t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Since, by (4.3)
(4.4) dyt = dyˆt − E
[
v˜|F yˆt
]
βtdt
we see that
(4.5) Fyt ⊆ F yˆt .
To prove the converse we use that by an extension of the Kalman filter we
have (see Lipser and Shiryaev (1978), Theorem 12.2)
(4.6) pt := E
[
v˜|F yˆt
]
=
p0 + S0
∫ t
0
βs
σ2s
dyˆs
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs
σs
)2ds
; p0 = E[v˜]
and
(4.7) St := E[(v˜ − pt)2] = S0
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs
σs
)2ds
; S0 = E[(v˜ − p0)2].
Put
(4.8) Kt = 1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs
σs
)2
ds.
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Combining (4.6) and (4.8) with (4.4) we get
Ktdyt = Ktdyˆt −
(
p0 + S0
∫ t
0
βs
σ2s
dyˆs
)
βtdt
or
Ktβt
σ2t
dyˆt − S0β
2
t
σ2t
(∫ t
0
βs
σ2s
dyˆs
)
dt =
Ktβt
σ2t
(dyt + p0βtdt).
If we define
Rt =
∫ t
0
βs
σ2s
dyˆs
this can be written
KtdRt − S0β
2
t
σ2t
Rtdt =
Ktβt
σ2t
(dyt + p0βtdt).
If we multiply this equation with 1
Kt
exp(−γt), where
(4.9) γt =
∫ t
0
S0β
2
s
σ2sKs
ds ,
we get
exp(−γt)dRt − S0β
2
t
σ2tKt
exp(−γt)Rtdt = exp(−γt) βt
σ2t
(dyt + p0βtdt).
This can be written
d(exp(−γt)Rt) = exp(−γt) βt
σ2t
(dyt + p0βtdt).
Integrating this we obtain
Rt = exp γt
∫ t
0
exp(−γs)βs
σ2s
(dys + p0βsds).
Therefore
dRt =
βt
σ2t
dyˆt =
βt
σ2t
dyt + p0βtdt
+ exp γt
(∫ t
0
exp(−γs)βs
σ2s
(dys + p0βsds
)S0β2t
σ2tKt
dt .(4.10)
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This shows that yˆt can be expressed in terms of ys; s ≤ t and hence that
F yˆt ⊆ Fyt .
Combining this with (4.5) we obtain Fyt = F yˆt and the proof of Lemma 4.1
is complete.
From filtering theory we know that y˜ defined by dy˜t :=
1
σt
dyt is a Brownian
motion with respect to the information filtration Fyt .5
Using (2.2), (2.3) and the definition y = x+ z, we see that what we have
called the innovation process y in the above is equal to the total accumulated
order process of the previous section. Returning to the equation (2.5), there
is a analog of Itoˆ’s formula for forward integration, which says that
(4.11) d−(xtpt) = xtd−pt + ptd−xt + dptdxt,
(see formula (5.11) of Appendix I). Since x has finite variation, dptdxt = 0
and we get
(4.12) wT = w0 + xTpT − x0p0 −
∫ T
0
ptd
−xt.
Since (v˜ − pt) ⊥ pt in L2(P ), i.e., E[(v˜ − pt)pt] = 0, we see that
(4.13) E[
∫ T
0
ptd
−xt] =
∫ T
0
E[pt(v˜ − pt)]βtdt = 0.
Therefore we get that
E[wT ] = w0 + E[xTpT ] = w0 + E[pT
∫ T
0
(v˜ − pt)βtdt]
= w0 + E
[
(pT − v˜ + v˜)
∫ T
0
(v˜ − pt)βtdt
]
= w0 + E
[ ∫ T
0
(v˜ − pt)βtdt
]
−
∫ T
0
E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)]βtdt
= w0 +
∫ T
0
E[(v˜ − pt)2)]βtdt−
∫ T
0
E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)]βtdt.(4.14)
5The result that 1σy is a Brownian motion with respect to the market makers’ informa-
tion was assumed by Back (1992).
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As before let
(4.15) St = S
(β)
t := E[(v˜ − pt)2]
and define
(4.16) St,T = S
(β)
t,T := E[(v˜ − pt)(v˜ − pT )]; 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
(Note that if we had assumed that
pT = v˜ a.s.
then we would get St,T = 0 and the proof would simplify considerably.)
Then (4.14) can be written
(4.17) E[wT ] = w0 +
∫ T
0
S
(β)
t βtdt−
∫ T
0
S
(β)
t,T βtdt.
From (4.7) we see that St satisfies the Riccati equation
(4.18) S ′t :=
dSt
dt
= −β
2
t
σ2t
S2t ; S0 = E[(v˜ − E[v˜])2].
By (4.6) we get that
(4.19) pt = E[v˜|Fyt ] = E[v˜|F yˆt ]
satisfies the equation
(4.20) dpt =
βtSt
σ2t
dyt =
βtSt
σ2t
(
(v˜ − pt)βtdt+ σtdBt
)
.
Hence
d(v˜ − pt) = −β
2
t St
σ2t
(v˜ − pt)dt− βtSt
σt
dBt,
or
d(v˜ − pt) + β
2
t St
σ2t
(v˜ − pt)dt = −βtSt
σt
dBt .
This can be written
d
(
exp
(∫ t
0
β2sSs
σ2s
ds
)
(v˜ − pt)
)
= −βtSt
σt
exp
(∫ t
0
β2sSs
σ2s
ds
)
dBt .
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Integrating this we get
v˜ − pt = (v˜ − p0) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
β2sSs
σ2s
ds
)
−
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
s
β2uSu
σ2u
du
)βsSs
σs
dBs .
This implies that
S
(β)
t,T = E[(v˜ − pt)(v˜ − pT )]
= E[(v˜ − p0)2] exp
(
−
∫ t
0
β2sSs
σ2s
ds−
∫ T
0
β2sSs
σ2s
ds
)
+
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
s
β2uSu
σ2u
du−
∫ T
s
β2uSu
σ2u
du
)β2sS2s
σ2s
ds .(4.21)
In particular, note that
(4.22) S
(β)
t,T ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]
and
(4.23) S
(β)
t,T = 0 if pT = v˜.
We now return to problem (2.6). By combining (4.17) and (4.7) we see
that our original problem can be formulated as the following control problem:
Problem 1. Maximize
(4.24) J1(β) := S0
∫ T
0
βtdt
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs
σs
)2ds
−
∫ T
0
S
(β)
t,T βtdt
over all β ∈ A, where A is the set of all (deterministic) functions β : [0, T ]→
R which are continuously differentiable on (0, T ).
We will first study the following related problem:
Problem 2. Maximize
(4.25) J(β) := S0
∫ T
0
βtdt
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs
σs
)2ds
over all β ∈ A.
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We will find the optimal control βˆ ∈ A for Problem 2 and show that the
corresponding terminal price p
(βˆ)
T satisfies
(4.26) p
(βˆ)
T = v˜ a.s.
It follows by (4.16) that S
(βˆ)
t,T = 0 and hence βˆ is also optimal for Problem 1,
because,
sup
β∈A
J1(β) ≤ sup
β∈A
J(β) = J(βˆ) = J1(βˆ) ≤ sup
β∈A
J1(β).
In view of this we now proceed to solve Problem 2. Since the map
β → J(β); β ∈ A
is concave, we can use the following perturbation argument to find the max-
imizer for J(·):
Suppose β ∈ A maximizes
J(β) := S0
∫ T
0
(
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs
σs
)2
ds
)−1
βtdt.
Choose an arbitrary function ξ ∈ A and define the real function g by
(4.27) g(y) = J(β + yξ); y ∈ R.
Then g is maximal at y = 0 and hence
0 = g′(0) =
d
dy
J(β + yξ)|y=0 =
d
dy
(
S0
∫ T
0
(
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(βs + yξs)
2
σ2s
ds
)−1
(βt + yξt)dt
)∣∣∣
y=0
=
S0
∫ T
0
(
1 + S0
∫ t
0
β˜2sds
)−1
ξtdt− S20
∫ T
0
(
1 + S0
∫ t
0
β˜2sds
)−2( ∫ t
0
2βsξs
σ2s
ds
)
βtdt
=
∫ T
0
Stξtdt− 2
∫ T
0
S2t
( ∫ t
0
βsξs
σ2s
ds
)
βtdt.
Changing the order of integration in the last term we get∫ T
0
Stξtdt− 2
∫ T
0
( ∫ T
s
S2t βtdt
)βsξs
σ2s
ds = 0,
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or ∫ T
0
{St − 2(
∫ T
t
S2sβsds)
βt
σ2t
}ξtdt = 0.
Since ξ ∈ A was arbitrary, we conclude that an optimal βt must satisfy the
equation
(4.28) σ2tSt = 2βt
∫ T
t
S2sβsds
where, as before, St is given by equation (4.7). This is an integral equation
in the unknown function β. Differentiating (4.28) with respect to t we get
2σtσ
′
tSt + σ
2
tS
′
t = 2β
′
t
∫ T
t
S2sβsds− 2β2t S2t .
Combining this with (4.11) we obtain
(4.29) 2σtσ
′
tSt + β
2
t S
2
t = 2β
′
t
∫ T
t
S2sβsds.
We now combine (4.28) and (4.29) to get
2σtσ
′
tSt + β
2
t S
2
t =
β′t
βt
σ2tSt
or
β′t
βt
=
2σ′t
σt
+
β2t
σ2t
S0
(1 + S0
∫ t
0
β2s
σ2s
ds)
.
Integrating this we obtain, with ci integration constant, i = 1, 2, . . .
log βt = 2 log σt + log(1 + S0
∫ t
0
β2s
σ2s
ds) + c1
or
(4.30) βt = c2σ
2
t (1 + S0
∫ t
0
β2s
σ2s
ds).
Define
(4.31) αt =
βt
σ2t
.
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Then equation (4.30) gives the non-linear, separable differential equation
α′t = c2S0σ
2
tα
2
t ,
which has the general solution
αt =
(
c3 − c2S0
∫ t
0
σ2sds
)−1
or
(4.32) βt = σ
2
t
(
c3 − c2S0
∫ t
0
σ2sds
)−1
.
Substituting (4.32) into the right hand side (RHS) of (4.30) we get
RHS = c2σ
2
t
(
1 + S0
∫ t
0
σ2s(c3 − c2S0
∫ s
0
σ2udu)
−2ds
)
= c2σ
2
t
(
1 +
1
c2
∣∣∣t
0
1
c3 − c2S0
∫ s
0
σ2udu
)
= σ2t
[
c2 +
( 1
c3 − c2S0
∫ t
0
σ2udu
− 1
c3
)]
=
σ2t
(
(
∫ t
0
σ2udu)
(
c2S0 − c22c3S0
)
+ c2c
2
3
)
c3
(
c3 − c2S0
∫ t
0
σ2udu
) .
Therefore, (4.30) holds if and only if
c2S0 − c22c3S0 = 0,
i.e.,
(4.33) c2c3 = 1.
Substituting this into (4.32) we get
(4.34) βt =
σ2t c2
1− c22S0
∫ t
0
σ2sds
.
From (4.28) we deduce that
(4.35) lim
t→T−
βt =∞.
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Using this in (4.34) we deduce that
(4.36) c22S0
∫ T
0
σ2sds = 1
which gives
(4.37) βt =
σ2t
( ∫ T
0
σ2sds
) 1
2
S
1
2
0
∫ T
t
σ2sds
.
By (4.20) we know that the corresponding conditional expected value pt =
E(v˜|Fyt ) is given by
(4.38) dpt =
βtSt
σ2t
dyt = λtdyt,
with
(4.39) λt =
St
( ∫ T
0
σ2sds
) 1
2
S
1
2
0
∫ T
t
σ2sds
; 0 ≤ t < T.
Now recall from equation (4.7) that
St = E[(v˜ − pt)2] = S0
1 + S0
∫ t
0
(
βs
σs
)2
ds
; S0 = var(v˜) = σ
2
v˜ .
By the use of (4.37) we find that
(4.40) St =
S0
1 +
( ∫ T
0
σ2sds
) ∫ t
0
σ2u
(
R T
u σ
2
sds)
2
du
=
S0
∫ T
t
σ2sds∫ T
0
σ2sds
.
In particular,
(4.41) ST = 0 and hence pT = v˜ a.s.
Inserting the expression (4.40) for St into the expression for λt in (4.39), we
obtain
(4.42) λt ≡ λ =
√
S0√∫ T
0
σ2sds
; a constant.
This solves Problem 2 and hence, in view of (4.41), also Problem 1. That
completes the proof of Theorem 2.1. 
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5 Conclusions
Under a set of rather natural assumptions we have formulated an insider’s
problem as maximizing the expected value of future wealth subject to the
price of the stock satisfying the rational pricing rule (2.2) and the strategy
satisfying (2.3). This latter constraint seems reasonable, since from (4.12)
we see that the insiders wealth can be written (x0 = 0)
(5.1) wT = w0 + v˜xT −
∫ T
0
ptd
−xt = w0 + v˜xT −
∫ T
0
ptdxt,
where the equality follows since x has finite variation. As a consequence
the final net wealth equals the value of the final position less the cost of
acquiring it. The cost formula is analogous to the usual one for the cost of
a discriminating monopsonist. It also follows that this final wealth can be
written
(5.2) wT = w0 +
∫ T
0
(v˜ − pt)d−xt = w0 +
∫ T
0
(v˜ − pt)dxt,
(assumption (4.2) on p. 1326 in Kyle (1985)).
From our assumptions we derive that the rational pricing rule has the
form
(5.3) pt = E(v˜) +
∫ t
0
λsdys
(assumption (4.3) p. 1326 of Kyle (1985)). Even in the case of time-varying
noise trading we obtain that the price response function λt = λ for all t, a
constant.6
We had to use an extended stochastic integral to achieve our goal, and
given this new concept our approach was rather direct and gave a unique
solution to the problem, provided our assumptions. Moreover, this line of
attack seems like a natural framework to further investigate some of the
problems underlying insider trading and differential information.
6The results (5.1)-(5.3) follow from our assumptions, which are the same as the ones
that Kyle employ, even if he chooses to call them assumptions (Kyle (1985) (4.1)-(4-3) p.
1236).
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We emphasize that our paper differs from those of Kyle (1985) and Back
(1992) in several ways:
1) We have fewer and weaker assumptions about the model. Several as-
sumptions in the above papers are proved still to hold under the more
general setup of our model.
2) Our method of proof is different. Since we do not assume a priori a
Markovian setup, and since we allow v˜ to depend on {z(s); 0 ≤ s ≤ T},
we cannot use classical dynamical programming, as Back does. Instead
we use forward integration and a perturbation method.
See Remark 2.2 for more details.
Appendix I: The forward integral
Consider a general information filtration Gt ⊃ Ft. If Bt is a Brownian motion
with respect to Ft, it need not be a semimartingale with respect to a bigger
filtration Gt ⊃ Ft. A simple example is
Gt = Ft+δ; t ≥ 0
where δ > 0 is a constant.
First we ask the question what integrals of the form
∫ t
0
xsdBs are supposed
to mean when xs is Gs-adapted. In this paper Gt is the information filtration
of the insider, while Ft is the corresponding information filtration generated
by the order process y and thus possessed by the market makers. Below we
consider forward integrals of processes driven by Brownian motion.
The forward integral
∫ t
0
xsd
−Bs is defined by
(5.4)
∫ T
0
xtd
−Bt := lim
∆ti→0
∑
i
xti(Bti+1 −Bti),
whenever the limit exists in probability, and 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < · · · <
tn = T is a partition of [0, T ]. Thus this integral is defined in the intuitive
manner as a limit of sums, and it should be clear that when xt is Ft-adapted,
this integral coincides with the ordinary Itoˆ integral over non-anticipating
functions. Viewed this way, the forward integral is a direct and very natural
extension of the Itoˆ integral to anticipating (non-adapted) functions.
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More formally, suppose x : [0, T ]→ R is a measurable stochastic process
adapted to the filtration Gt but not necessarily to the filtration Ft. The
forward integral of x with respect to Bt was first defined by Russo and Vallois
(1993), and was applied to insider trading, in a framework different from the
one in the present paper, in Biagini and Øksendal (2005). For our purpose,
it is sufficient to consider the case when x is left continuous with right-sided
limits (ca`gla`d). Then the original definition simplifies to (5.4).
One can show that if xt is adapted to some filtration Gt such that Bt
is a Gt-semimartingale, then the forward integral of x coincides with the
semimartingale integral of x (if it exists). See Biagini and Øksendal (2005).
Thus the forward integral is an extension of the semimartingale integral to
(possibly) non-semimartingale contexts.
An Itoˆ formula for the forward integrals was first obtained by Russo and
Vallois (1995, 2000). It may be presented as follows: Let Xt = Xt(ω) be a
stochastic process of the form
(5.5) Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
αsds+
∫ t
0
βsd
−Bs; X0 ∈ R, a constant,
where α and β are measurable processes, such that∫ t
0
{|αs|+ β2s}ds <∞ a.s. for all t,
and β is forward integrable. A short hand differential notation for (5.5) is
(5.6) d−Xt = αtdt+ βtd−Bt; X0 ∈ R.
Such processes Xt are called forward processes.
Theorem 5.1 (The one-dimensional Itoˆ formula for the forward processes).
Let Xt be as above and let f ∈ C1,2(R× R) . Define
Yt = f(t,Xt).
Then Yt is again a forward process and
(5.7) d−Yt =
∂
∂t
f(t,Xt) dt+
∂
∂x
f(t,Xt) d
−Xt +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
f(t,Xt) β
2
t dt.
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Note the similarity between this and the classical Itoˆ formula. We refer
to Russo and Vallois (1995, 2000) for a proof.
The Itoˆ formula extends to several dimensions, as follows:
Theorem 5.2 (The multi-dimensional Itoˆ formula for the forward processes).
Let
(5.8) d−X(i)t = α
(i)
t dt+
m∑
k=1
β
(i,k)
t d
−B(k)t ; 1 ≤ i ≤ n
be n forward processes, driven by m independent Brownian motions
(B
(1)
t , · · · , B(m)t ). Let f ∈ C1,2(R× Rn) and define
Yt = f(t,Xt).
Then Yt is again a forward process and
d−Yt =
∂
∂t
f(t,Xt) dt+
n∑
i=1
∂
∂xi
f(t,Xt) d
−X(i)t
+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
∂2
∂xi∂xj
f(t,Xt) dX
(i)
t dX
(j)
t ,
(5.9)
where
(5.10) dX
(i)
t dX
(j)
t =
m∑
k=1
β
(i,k)
t β
(j,k)
t dt.
Example 5.3. Suppose m = 1 and n = 2, i.e.,
d−X(i)t = α
i
t dt+ β
(i)
t d
−Bt; i = 1, 2.
Choose f(t, x1, x2) = x1x2 and define
Yt = f(t,Xt) = X
(1)
t X
(2)
t .
Then by (5.9) and (5.10) we get
(5.11) d−(X(1t X
(2)
t ) = d
−Yt = X
(1)
t d
−X(2)t +X
(2)
t d
−X(1)t + β
(1)
t β
(2)
t dt.
This is the formula we use in (4.11), and later.
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